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A reductio of coherentism 
 
TOM STONEHAM 
 
I put forward the following argument in the spirit of curiosity. On the face of it, the 
argument gives a conclusive reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of 
justification. But that cannot be right, can it? 
 
(1) There are finite sets of beliefs such that each member of the set is epistemically 
supported by some other members (and nothing else). (Coherentism) 
 
Comment: A belief b(p) is epistemically supported by the belief b(q) IFF b(p)’s 
justifiedness or reasonableness (for a subject at a time) consists in part in b(p) 
standing in some relation of dependence to b(q). Exactly what that dependence 
relation is will be a matter of debate amongst coherentists. While a coherentist will 
typically prefer to say that a belief is justified in virtue of it being a member of a 
coherent set of beliefs, it will be epistemically supported by individual members of 
the set precisely when the condition just stated is met. 
 
(2) The relation of epistemic support is transitive. (Axiom) 
 
Comment: The coherentist will probably want to allow exceptions to transitivity in 
order to prevent a belief epistemically supporting itself. Thus we might replace (2) 
with the weaker: 
 
(2*) ∀xyz((x≠z & Exy & Eyz) → Exz). 
 
(3) The relation of epistemic support is not asymmetric. (From 1 and 2 or 2*) 
 
Reasoning: From (1), b1 is supported by b2 and b1≠b2, b2 is supported by b3 and b2≠b3, 
b3 is supported by b4 etc. Since the set is finite, for some i and j, bi=bj. Without loss of 
generality suppose there are only three beliefs and b1=b4. Then b3 is supported by b1. 
Since b1 is supported by b2 and b2 is supported by b3, by transitivity – or (2*) provided 
b1≠b3 – b1 is supported by b3. So the relation is not asymmetric. 
 
(4) For some p and q and some thinker at some time, it is possible that the belief 
that p&q is better supported than the belief that p or the belief that q alone. (From 3) 
 
Reasoning: From (3) it is possible that there is a subject with stock of beliefs S such 
that b(p) supports b(q) in the presence of S (iff b(p) has positive support) and b(q) 
supports b(p) in the presence of S (iff b(q) has positive support). Since, in the 
presence of S, b(p) supports b(q) and vice versa, S+b(p) provides more support for 
b(q) than S alone and S+b(q) provides more support for b(p) than S alone. Suppose a 
subject has S but not b(p) or b(q) and that S does not support b(p) or b(q) or b(~p) or 
b(~q). Then if the subject adds just b(p) or just b(q), he will be adding a belief with no 
support, but if he adds both he will be adding a belief (viz. b(p&q)) with positive 
support. 
 
(5) The belief that p epistemically supports the belief that q only if p raises the 
probability of q. (Axiom) 
 
(6) There is a pair of propositions such that pr(p&q) > pr(p). (From 4 and 5) 
 
Reasoning: These probabilities are credences. Suppose our subject has belief set S and 
comes to consider p and q, then the credence of p is 0.5 but the credence of p&q is 
>0.5. 
 
(7) pr(p&q) is always less than or equal to pr(q). (Theorem) 
 
(8) So (1) is false. (RAA on 6 and 7) 
 
Which premise can the coherentist reject? (1) is characteristic of her view. (2) is 
pretty much analytic. (5) might be a matter for debate, but it is hard to see how there 
could be counterexamples, and if it is weakened to: 
 
(5*) The belief that p epistemically supports the belief that q only if p does not 
lower the probability of q, 
 
a great deal more would need to be said to explain why epistemic support is a truth-
conducive property. How can p give us any reason to believe q is true if the truth of p 
does not make q any more likely? Finally, (7) is a theorem of probability theory and, 
while it may not be much respected in intuitive judgements of probability, no theorist 
can deny it. 
 
The coherentist might try to reject the inference from (3) to (4). She might question 
whether a belief set which provided no support at all for b(p) and b(q) could be one in 
the presence of which b(p) supports b(q) and vice versa. But the reasoning only 
assumed that S provided no support for b(p) and b(q) to simplify its expression – the 
only assumption we really needed was that S+b(p) provides more support for b(q) 
than S alone and S+b(q) provides more support for b(p) than S alone. And that must 
be the case for any S in the presence of which b(p) supports b(q) and vice versa.  
 
She might also question the inference from (4) and (5) to (6): prior to believing p and 
q, pr(p)=0.5 and pr(q)=0.5 so pr(p&q)≤0.5, but once she comes to have both those 
beliefs the probability of each rises and thus pr(p&q) becomes >0.5. Thus the 
objection is that the inference from (4) confuses epistemic support at a time for 
something one does not yet believe with the support it will have when one later comes 
to believe it. So while pr(p&q) at t2 > pr(p) at t1, there is no time at which 
pr(p&q)>pr(p). 
 
But while we should accept this general distinction, it only makes a difference when 
there is some other change in the subject's beliefs by the time she comes to believe the 
proposition in question. Since the only reason why the pr(p&q) is greater after the 
subject comes to believe p and q can be that she now believes that very proposition, 
the inference from (4) would only be incorrect if the mere fact that I believe 
something can make it more reasonable for me to believe it, which is not in general 
true. 
 
The negation of (1) is: 
 
For any finite set of beliefs all of which have some positive degree of 
epistemic support, at least one member of that set does not receive its support 
entirely from the other members of the set. 
 
Which, pace infinitism, is a pretty good definition of foundationalism. Q.E.D. 
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